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Authorship and the Boundaries of Copyright:  
Ideas, Expressions, and Functions in Yoga, Choreography,  
and Other Works* 
 
Christopher Buccafusco\ 
One man created a series of bodily movements to be performed with musical 
accompaniment by a group of people.  Another man created a different series of 
bodily movements to be performed with different musical accompaniment also by a 
group of people.  The first man was Vaslav Nijinsky, and the creation was the 
choreography for the ballet Le Sacré du Printemps.1  The second man was Richard 
Simmons, and the creation was Sweatin’ to the Oldies.  Is there a difference 
between these creations for purposes of their copyrightability?  If so, where does it 
lie?2  Now consider a third creator, Alice. 
After years of study, research, and practice, Alice develops an original and 
creative series of physical, bodily movements which, when performed, will produce 
particular thoughts and feelings in the performer’s mind.  In addition, performing 
the sequence of movements will reduce the performer’s blood pressure and 
minimize her risk of injury.  Finally, Alice intends that some people will see the 
sequence performed and that they will think that it is graceful and reminiscent of 
various animals in motion. 
To what extent, if any, has Alice created a copyrightable work of authorship 
when she describes the series of movements in text and images?  According to the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Bikram’s Yoga College of India v. Evolation Yoga, the 
answer is likely none.3  The court ruled that the series of yoga poses developed by 
the plaintiff, Bikram Choudhury, was “an idea, process, or system,” and thus, 
ineligible for copyright protection.4 
This Essay uses the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as an opportunity to analyze the 
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Columbia Law School for hosting the symposium on “Copyright Outside the Box,” and to the students 
of the Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts for their assistance.  For helpful discussions I thank 
Penelope Bartlett, Bruce Boyden, Carys Craig, Jane Ginsburg, James Grimmelmann, Pippa Loengard, 
and Zahr Said. 
 1. The music for the ballet was composed by Igor Stravinsky, and the work premiered in Paris in 
1913.  See MODRIS EKSTEINS, RITES OF SPRING: THE GREAT WAR AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 
AGE 21–39 (1989) (discussing Ninjinsky’s and his collaborator Diaghilev’s development of modern 
ballet on the eve of World War I). 
 2. Other than the fact that the first was created in 1913 and is now in the public domain. 
 3. Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 4. Id. at 1040. 
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nature of copyrightable authorship and the mechanisms that copyright law uses to 
screen out uncopyrightable content from copyrightable works.  I argue that 
although the court likely reached the right result in Bikram, it did so in a confused 
and poorly supported manner.  Moreover, the court’s analysis would likely result in 
a determination that my hypothetical Alice also could not receive copyright 
protection, even though a proper understanding of copyright doctrine might lead to 
a different result.  I show how courts should deal with situations like these, in 
which potentially copyrightable expression is combined with unprotectable 
functional elements.  Essential to these questions is an understanding of the nature 
of copyrightable authorship.5 
Part I introduces the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and Part II explores a series of 
confused and confusing features of the court’s treatment of ideas, processes, and 
functionality.  Part III introduces a four-step test for analyzing copyrightability in 
contested cases. 
I.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION 
Choudhury had been studying yoga since childhood, and after decades of 
research, he developed a sequence of twenty-six postures, or “asanas,” and two 
breathing exercises that he began teaching and publishing in the 1970s.6  
Practitioners of Choudhury’s version of yoga complete the sequence of postures in 
the same order every time during a ninety-minute routine in a room heated to 105 
degrees Fahrenheit.7  Importantly, Choudhury claimed that he selected this series of 
postures because it had proven health and fitness benefits.8  He marketed his yoga 
sequence as a method to “avoid, correct, cure, heal, or at least alleviate the 
symptoms of almost any illness or injury.”9  In addition to these physical benefits, 
Choudhury also made two other claims about his yoga sequence.  He asserted that 
performing the yoga would produce spiritual or psychological benefits, including a 
“sense of well-being,” and he claimed that the arrangement of postures is 
“particularly beautiful and graceful.”10 
In 2011, Choudhury filed a complaint for copyright infringement against a 
competing studio for performing and teaching his yoga sequence.11  The district 
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that 
Choudhury’s yoga sequence is “a collection of facts and ideas” that is not entitled 
 
 5. See Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664891 [https://perma.cc/VMY3-6S8J]. 
 6. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1035. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 1039–40.  See Karolina Jesien, Don’t Sweat It: Copyright Protection for Yoga . . . Are 
Exercise Routines Next?, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 623 (2007); Katherine Machan, 
Bending Over Backwards for Copyright Protection: Bikram Yoga and the Quest for Federal Copyright 
Protection of an Asana Sequence, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 29, 30–36 (2004) (describing Choudhury’s 
sequence).  
 11. Choudhury had sued other yoga teachers in the past.  See Open Source Yoga Unity v. 
Choudhury, No. C 03-3182, 2005 WL 756558 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005). 
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to copyright protection, and Choudhury appealed to the Ninth Circuit.12  
Importantly, there was no dispute about whether Choudhury’s sequence of postures 
was sufficiently original and creative to qualify for copyright protection. 
Choudhury had registered copyrights in his various books and also in a 
“compilation of exercises” contained in the books.13  But the defendants did not 
copy his books.  To succeed, then, Choudhury needed to argue that the sequence 
described in the books was itself a protected work of authorship.  He argued that 
the graceful flow of the sequence was the equivalent of a dance or other 
choreographic work, which was protectable under § 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright 
Act.14 
According to the Ninth Circuit, however, the yoga sequence, whatever its 
aesthetic merit, ran afoul of § 102(b), which indicates that “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”15  To the court, the sequence is “at bottom . . . an idea, process, or 
system designed to improve health.”16  The court explained, “Copyright protects 
only the expression of this idea—the words and pictures used to describe the 
Sequence—and not the idea of the Sequence itself.  Because the Sequence is an 
unprotectable idea, it is also ineligible for copyright protection as a ‘compilation’ or 
‘choreographic work.’”17 
In deciding that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the so-called idea/expression 
dichotomy, the court curiously never explains what “this idea” actually is.  In 
addition, although the court regularly refers to the sequence as an “idea, system, or 
process,” it never defines those terms or explains why Choudhury’s sequence of 
movements is a system or process.  It seems like the court is most concerned that 
the sequence of postures is designed in part to cure, heal, or alleviate injuries, and 
that, if given copyright protection, Choudhury could avoid the more rigorous 
demands of the patent system, which are usually demanded of contributions to 
science and medicine.18 
The court rejected Choudhury’s claim that spiritual and psychological benefits 
associated with performing the sequence constitute copyrightable authorship.  More 
importantly, it rejected his arguments about the beauty or gracefulness of the 
sequence.  The court explained: 
 
 12. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1036.  
 13. Id. at 1035. 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976) lists the following categories of copyrightable works of authorship: 
literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual work; sound recordings; and 
architectural works.  
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). 
 16. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1036. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1039–40.  In order to obtain a patent, Choudhury would have to prove that his sequence 
of postures was useful, novel, and non-obvious.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (1952). 
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[T]he beauty of the process does not permit one who describes it to gain, through 
copyright, the monopolistic power to exclude all others from practicing it.  This is true 
even where, as here, the process was conceived with at least some aesthetic 
considerations in mind . . . .  [T]he Sequence remains unprotectable as a process the 
design of which primarily reflects function, not expression.19 
According to the court’s reasoning, because the sequence was primarily 
influenced by functional concerns about physical and mental well-being, it is 
entirely disqualified from copyright protection.  Any aspects of the sequence that 
were motivated by aesthetic concerns are, thus, bound up with the sequence’s 
function and are unprotected. 
The court’s finding that the yoga sequence “is an idea, process, or system”20 also 
meant that it could not be considered a copyrightable choreographic work, even 
though the sequence did correspond to the Copyright Office’s definition of a dance 
as “static and kinetic successions of bodily movement in certain rhythmic and 
spatial relationships.”21  Again, the court was adamant that once a work is 
characterized as an idea, system, or process it cannot be regarded as copyrightable 
regardless of the features it shares with other copyrightable works.22  Granting 
copyright protection to the yoga sequence would be equivalent to copyrighting “a 
method to churn butter or drill for oil.”23 
II.  UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING § 102(B) 
The Ninth Circuit’s application of § 102(b) in Bikram Yoga College is curious, 
confusing, and, ultimately, concerning.  Although the court likely reached the 
correct outcome in this case, its reasoning could produce incorrect and undesirable 
outcomes in future disputes.  This Part analyzes four problematic features of the 
Ninth Circuit’s application of § 102(b). 
A.  SECTION 102(B) HAS TWO SEPARATE FUNCTIONS 
In rejecting the copyrightability of Bikram’s yoga sequence, the court repeatedly 
calls it “an idea, process, or system.”24  In so doing, the court appears to be lumping 
together disparate aspects of § 102(b) into the same analysis.  The section precludes 
copyright for “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery.”  Scholars generally recognize this language as performing 
two separate functions.25  On one hand, the references to “idea . . . concept, [and] 
principle” serve to distinguish copyrightable creativity from aspects of works that 
 
 19. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1040 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. 
 21. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (SECOND), § 
450.01 (2d ed. 1984). 
 22. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1044 (“Even if the Sequence could fit within some colloquial definitions 
of dance or choreography, it remains a process ineligible for copyright protection.”). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1040–41, 1044.  
 25. JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 81 (3d ed. 2010). 
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must remain in the public domain.  Ideas, concepts, and principles are not subject to 
intellectual property protection of any sort, in part, because they are understood to 
be essential building blocks of creativity that creators should not be prevented from 
using.  On the other hand, the references to “procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, . . . or discovery” distinguish the realm of copyrightable subject matter 
from that of patent law.  One who develops a new procedure or invents a new 
discovery must seek patent protection and comply with its more rigorous demands; 
copyright protection is unavailable. 
By repeatedly referring to the yoga sequence as an idea, process, or system, the 
court lumps together these different aspects of § 102(b).  In so doing, the court 
undermines the clarity of its holding.  Some aspect of a work might fall afoul of the 
“idea, concept, principle” component of § 102(b), for example, by being too 
general or insufficiently original to qualify for protection.  Or some aspect of a 
work might fail under the “procedure, process, system” aspect of § 102(b) by being 
functional rather than expressive.  As we will see below, the distinction between 
these aspects of the section is key, because the rules that apply to them could be 
quite different.  But it is difficult to understand precisely what the Ninth Circuit 
held.  The court refers to the sequence as a “system designed to yield physical 
benefits” in one sentence—seemingly referring to the second component of 
§ 102(b)—and then, in the very next sentence, it says that protecting the sequence 
“is precluded by copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy”—seemingly referring to 
the first component of § 102(b).26  The court never explains how something can be 
both an idea capable of expression and also a process or system. 
B.  THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DISTINCTION IS NOT A BINARY 
To the extent that the court treats the yoga sequence as an “idea,” it does so in an 
unusual and confusing fashion.  According to the so-called “idea/expression” 
dichotomy, copyright protection does not extend to generic ideas but only to the 
particular manner in which the author expresses those ideas.  “Ideas” are 
unprotectable, as noted above, because they are unoriginal and are essential to all 
creativity.  But the idea/expression dichotomy is better understood as a spectrum 
rather than as a dichotomy.27  As Judge Learned Hand noted, ideas and expressions 
are different in degree, not in kind.28  As an author builds greater originality and 
specificity into her work, she moves away from the “idea” end of the spectrum and 
toward the “expression” end of the spectrum.29  And at some point along that 
 
 26. Id. at 13. 
 27. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:36 (“The idea-expression dichotomy is not a dichotomy or a test; 
it is not even an analytical tool.”). 
 28. See Nichols v. Univ. Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 29. “Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no 
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its 
title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his property is 
never extended. . . .  Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”  Id.  
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spectrum, the author reaches a point of sufficient originality and specificity such 
that copyright law kicks in. 
This is not how the Ninth Circuit seems to understand the relationship between 
ideas and expressions.  The court describes the sequence as “an unprotectable 
idea,”30 but it never identifies the idea or explains why the sequence constitutes an 
idea rather than an expression.  Read in the most charitable light, the court’s 
opinion seems to suggest that Choudhury had the idea to organize a series of poses 
in a certain way and that he expressed that idea in his books about the sequence.  
The books are copyrightable expression, but the sequence that they describe is 
simply an idea. 
But why should this be the case?  Why should we think that the sequence is 
insufficiently original and specific to qualify for copyright protection?  
Choudhury’s mental conception wasn’t simply that people might move around in 
various ways.  His conception was that people might move around in very specific 
ways in very specific conditions.  This conception is not obviously as generic and 
unoriginal as the notion of a story about star-crossed lovers or a movie about a 
down-on-his-luck boxer.  Nor is it clear where and when Choudhury’s idea 
becomes sufficiently particularized to constitute expression.  The court does not 
doubt that the books are copyrightable, but it also does not explain how and why 
they are.  In treating the sequence as “an idea,” the court seems to be treating ideas 
and expression as qualitatively distinct rather than as endpoints on a spectrum.31  
Although the court says that it is construing the scope of Choudhury’s copyright 
rather than determining its validity,32 it seems to be doing precisely the opposite.  
Time after time, the court explains that the sequence is not protectable “because it 
is an idea.”33 
C.  PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS ARE NOT SELF-DEFINING 
In addition to referring to the yoga sequence as an idea, the Ninth Circuit also 
refers to it as a “process or system.”  The court’s references to the sequence as a 
process or system rely on the second distinction made by § 102(b)—that between 
copyrightable works and patentable inventions.  According to this aspect of § 
102(b), certain kinds of creativity cannot receive copyright protection because they 
are the wrong kind of creativity; they are functional rather than expressive and 
consequently must meet patent law’s higher burdens.  The court, however, never 
defines a system or a process, and it tells us little about how it reached the 
determination that the sequence was one (or the other, or both). 
In this case, the court seems to be on solid ground in its determination that the 
sequence is a process or system, since Choudhury himself described it as such.  The 
court notes that he referred to the sequence as a “system” or a “method” “designed 
 
 30. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1036. 
 31. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:36 (“[A]s a result the idea-expression dichotomy’s principal role 
should be at the infringement, not at the copyrightability stage . . . .”). 
 32. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1038. 
 33. Id. at 1044 (emphasis added). 
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to ‘systematically work every part of the body . . . .’”34  But just because 
Choudhury used the terms “system” and “method” does not mean that he was using 
them in the way that § 102(b) does.  Indeed, other authors have referred to their 
works as systems or methods, and courts have still found in favor of copyright 
protection.35 
So what makes the sequence a process or system in violation of § 102(b)?  The 
jurisprudence in this area is unclear,36 and the Ninth Circuit did little to change that.  
The terms “system” and “process” are not self-defining, and they are not defined in 
the Copyright Act. Systems suggest principles by which something is done or 
organized schematically, but the Seventh Circuit upheld the copyrightability of a 
taxonomy of dental procedures.37  A process seems to involve a series of steps to 
produce a result.  But written musical notation can be described as a process by 
which a person produces a result, and no one would call a sonata an 
uncopyrightable process.  As the Seventh Circuit noted, “few ‘how-to’ works are 
systems,” otherwise many works, including architectural blueprints, would not 
receive copyright protection.38 
The Ninth Circuit seems to base its decision that the sequence is a system or 
process in violation of § 102(b) on Choudhury’s assertions that the sequence was 
designed to improve physical and spiritual health and that these goals are the wrong 
sorts of goals for a copyrightable work.  Choudhury created the sequence “after 
many years of research and verification . . . using modern medical measurement 
techniques,” and the text in his books promises that his “system of Hatha Yoga is 
capable of helping you avoid, correct, cure, heal, or at least alleviate the symptoms 
of almost any illness or injury.”39  The court refers to these statements as evidence 
that Choudhury was attempting “to secure copyright protection for a healing art: a 
system designed to yield physical benefits and a sense of well-being.”40  
Accordingly, because “the design of [the system] primarily reflects function,”41 the 
court determines that it should fall on the patent side of the § 102(b) line. 
The court explains that the sequence “sets forth a method to attain 
identifiable . . . results,” making it a process or system.42  As noted above, however, 
providing a method to attain results does not necessarily make a work an 
uncopyrightable process.  The court should instead consider the kinds of results that 
the method produces.  Here, the court treats the sequence’s purported physical and 
 
 34. Id. at 1038. 
 35. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that 
although plaintiff’s computer program looks like a “method of operation” and although its developers 
refer to it as a “method,” it does not fall afoul of § 102(b)); see also Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 
1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We conclude that although an element of a work may be characterized as 
a method of operation, that element may nevertheless contain expression that is eligible for copyright 
protection.”). 
 36. Buccafusco, supra note 5. 
 37. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 38. Id. at 980. 
 39. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1039. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1040. 
 42. Id. 
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mental health benefits as the wrong kind of results.  Little is said, though, about 
why this is the case.  Certainly, curing diseases and alleviating physical symptoms 
seem like they are the province of patentable inventions rather than copyrightable 
works of authorship, and I suspect that most courts and scholars would agree.43  
More controversial, however, is the court’s treatment of the sequence’s spiritual 
benefits, including “a general sense of peace” and “a sense of well-being” as 
inappropriate for copyright law.  It is not clear how the sequence’s effects on the 
minds of its practitioners are different from the effects that a musical composition 
has on the minds of its audience.  And again, no one would claim that a symphony 
falls afoul of § 102(b) because listening to it produces a sense of peace or well-
being. 
D.  SCREENING FUNCTIONALITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
The final curious feature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is its treatment of 
Choudhury’s claims that the sequence of postures is “particularly beautiful and 
graceful.”44  But, according to the court, “beauty is not a basis for copyright 
protection.”45  The court accepted Choudhury’s contention that aspects of the 
sequence “were conceived with at least some aesthetic considerations in mind,” but 
it discarded those considerations.46  Having decided that the sequence is a process 
or system, “the design of which primarily reflects function, not expression,”47 the 
court treated it as per se uncopyrightable despite its expressive content. 
The court’s treatment of the sequence’s beautiful elements is unclear and could 
represent one of two different approaches to treating works that include both 
expressive and functional elements.48  One possibility is that the court is applying a 
threshold based screening mechanism for excluding some works from copyright 
protection.  The court indicates that although the sequence contains aesthetic or 
expressive elements, because its design “primarily reflects” functional 
considerations, the work is not entitled to copyright protection.  The court seems to 
have jotted up the number of design elements that were functional and the number 
that were expressive, and, having found that the functional ones predominate, it 
declared the sequence uncopyrightable. 
This sort of functionality threshold screening is similar to that applied to 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) works that qualify as “useful articles” 
because they have an intrinsic utilitarian function.49  Such works are only 
copyrightable to the extent that they have “features that can be identified separately 
 
 43. On the relationship between mind and body in IP law, see Christopher Buccafusco, Making 
Sense of Intellectual Property, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2012) (discussing IP law’s differential 
treatment of the human senses). 
 44. Bikram, 803 F.3d at 1040. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (emphasis added). 
 48. For a more comprehensive treatment of functionality in IP, see Christopher Buccafusco & 
Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens in Intellectual Property Law (on file with author). 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (defining “useful article”). 
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from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.”50  To determine this “separability” issue, courts have formulated a number 
of different tests, but they each act, effectively, as functionality thresholds.  If a 
work is deemed too functional, either quantitatively or qualitatively, it gets no 
copyright protection whatsoever. 
Threshold based functionality screening of this sort is, however, only supposed 
to be used for PGS works, and it is not appropriate for either literary works or 
choreographic works.  For example, in the taxonomy case mentioned above, the 
Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the district court’s use of threshold based 
separability test to a literary work, noting that, “the unique limitations on the 
protection of [PGS works] do not extend to the written word.”51  For literary and 
choreographic works, courts should screen out functionality through filtering rather 
than through thresholds.  Filtering style screening involves the removal, when 
determining copyright scope, of elements of the work that are functional rather than 
authorial.  No matter how functional the work is, the author still receives copyright 
protection for those elements of the work that represent original authorship.  Thus, 
computer programs, which are overwhelmingly designed in accordance with 
functional goals, are nonetheless granted copyright protection for those elements of 
programs that contain authorship.  To the extent that Choudhury was claiming a 
copyright in either a literary or choreographic work, then, the functional elements 
of the sequence should have been addressed via filtering rather than via a threshold. 
The second possible way in which the Ninth Circuit approached the requirement 
of screening out functional elements of the sequence was through a rule of per se 
exclusion.  Certain kinds of works do not receive copyright protection simply 
because Congress has not extended it to them.  When Congress utilized its 
constitutional power under Article I., § 8, cl. 8 to grant copyright to seven 
categories of works in the 1976 Act, it did not exhaust its power.52  Some 
categories of works that are “Writings” of “Authors” nonetheless did not receive 
protection, including, at the time, architectural works.  Culinary dishes, perfumes, 
and gardens remain outside of the statutory scheme,53 while architectural works 
received protection starting in 1990.54 
Choudhury’s sequence plausibly falls within the scope of statutory protection.  
Choudhury’s books are clearly protected as literary works, and he also claimed that 
his sequence could qualify as a choreographic work.55  As noted above, these are 
 
 50. Id. (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). 
 51. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1997).  I can find 
no case in which a court has analyzed a choreographic work to determine whether it had too many 
functional components to receive copyright protection. 
 52. H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (“In using the phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ rather 
than ‘all the writings of an author’ now in section 4 of the statute, the committee’s purpose is to avoid 
exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to eliminate the 
uncertainties arising from the latter phrase.”); see R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in 
the “Next Great Copyright Act”, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489 (2014). 
 53. Buccafusco, supra note 5, at 53. 
 54. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101–650, § 703 (1990). 
 55. Choudhury attempted to register the sequence as a work of performing arts, but was rejected 
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protected categories of authorship.  Possibly, then, the Ninth Circuit simply decided 
that the sequence was a process or system and, thus, determined that it and all of its 
aspects were automatically excluded from copyright protection.  This approach 
would place an unusual construction on § 102(b).  The court seems to read that 
section to require that a work (and any aspect of it) cannot receive protection if it is 
a system or process, notwithstanding expressive elements in it.  But this is exactly 
backwards.  Properly read, §§ 102(a) and 102(b) indicate that although a work can 
qualify for protection if it constitutes an original work of authorship that falls 
within one of the named categories in § 102(a), no aspect of the work qualifies for 
copyright protection to the extent that it is a system, process, or method of 
operation.  Just because a work has system-like or process-like features does not 
mean that the authorial, expressive features of the work do not qualify for 
protection if they are otherwise copyrightable.56 
As with other aspects of the court’s opinion, its approach to functionality 
screening is confused and confusing.  The rules that it applies, to the extent that we 
can determine what they are, are not the rules that Congress has provided for 
determining copyrightability. 
 
III.  AUTHORSHIP, YOGA, AND CHOREOGRAPHY:  
A FOUR-STEP GUIDE 
 
Despite all of the criticisms in Part II, the Ninth Circuit probably reached the 
correct conclusion in the case.  Because the decision’s grounds are shaky, however, 
other cases are likely to come out incorrectly.  This Part approaches the issue of 
yoga copyrightability from the perspective of my theory of authorship, and it 
explains the proper analysis of ideas, expression, and functionality in these and 
similar cases.  Part III suggests a series of analytical steps that courts should 
undertake when confronted with these issues.  While the discussion here is limited 
to the copyrightability of yoga sequences, it is applicable to all areas of 
copyrightable authorship. 
 Step 1:  Does the work contain authorship? 
Authorship is a constitutional requirement for copyright law, and no creation 
that does not entail at least some degree of authorship is eligible for copyright 
protection.  In previous work, I have argued that copyrightable authorship is best 
understood as the intentional creation of mental effects in an audience.  The 
requirement that a work produce mental effects distinguishes the sort of creativity 
that is amenable to copyright protection from the sort of functional creativity that is 
only amenable to patent protection.  The term “mental effects” substitutes for the 
more usual “expression,” in an attempt to describe the various ways in which works 
such as paintings, musical compositions, and choreography entail authorship.57  
 
by the Copyright Office.  2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:22 (2015). 
 56. That is, if they are original, creative, and fixed.  
 57. The notion that authors express ideas is excessively rationalist, and it obscures the ways in 
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Copyright can exist only in the manner by which the author chooses to create 
mental effects; aspects of the work that are not so intended cannot receive 
copyright protection. 
From the perspective of a yoga sequence, it should be clear that a creator could 
specify particular arrangements of the body in a given order with the intention that 
someone either seeing or performing the arrangement would feel and think certain 
things.58  To the extent that she does, those aspects of the work constitute 
authorship.  Relevant mental effects would include contortion of the body to mimic 
shapes in nature, as well as poses or sequences of poses that produce certain 
feelings, like peacefulness, well-being, or oneness with humanity or that give rise 
to a sense of beauty.59 
Although Choudhury claimed that aspects of his sequence were designed with 
these concerns in mind, all of the evidence in the case suggests that he was 
primarily concerned with physical health.60  Curing diseases and treating ailments 
are functional goals; they are not the kinds of results that copyright law promotes.  
They are not mental, but rather physical, effects.  Any aspect of the sequence which 
was created for these purposes is automatically excluded from the realm of 
copyrightability.  If anything remains—if there are identifiable aspects of the 
sequence that were intended to create mental effects—then the author is allowed to 
continue to the second step. 
Step 2:  Is the authorship original, creative, and fixed? 
In order to obtain copyright protection, authors must prove that their works meet 
other constitutional requirements.  Authorship entails the manner or form in which 
someone arranges elements—in our case, physical movements of the human 
body—to create mental effects.  But that authorship is only entitled to copyright 
protection if it is (1) original, in the sense that it is independently created; (2) at 
least minimally creative, by being more than trivially clever or non-obvious; and 
(3) fixed in a tangible medium of expression.61 
 
which many works are not about ideas but instead are intended to produce emotions and feelings.  
Buccafusco, supra note 5, at 35–36. 
 58. It is not important, for purposes of copyrightability, whether the audience or the performer in 
fact feel and think the things that the author intended.  It is sufficient if the author intended them to feel 
and think.  See Buccafusco, supra note 5, at 27 (discussing categorical and semantic intentions). 
 59. See Klas Nevrin, Empowerment and Using the Body in Modern Postural Yoga, in YOGA IN 
THE MODERN WORLD: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 120, 129 (Mark Singleton & Jean Byrne eds., 
2008) (“Yoga practices may also be accompanied by a particular emotional and imaginative poise, 
performatively enacted and felt by the person involved.”). 
 60. Id. at 125 (noting that improved health is “probably the most frequently voiced reason for 
attending yoga classes”); Wade Dazey, Yoga in America: Some Reflections from the Heartland, in 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF YOGA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GERALD JAMES LARSON 409, 422–23 (Knut 
A. Jacobsen, ed. 2005) (“[W]hat has appealed most to pragmatic Americans, of course, is the physical 
side of yoga practice: the postures, diet, and breathing exercises that promise health benefits, relaxation, 
and fitness.”). 
 61. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as the 
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed 
to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.  To be 
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In a case involving a yoga sequence, we would analyze each of the elements of 
authorship isolated in Step 1 to determine whether they met these criteria.  
Presumably all of them are fixed, because they have been reproduced in a book or 
in an audiovisual work.  Whether they are original and creative, however, would 
involve factual analysis of the author’s behavior and of the work’s relationship to 
the medium.  In Choudhury’s case, if any aspects of the work survived the first 
step, they would be subsequently tested to determine whether they were also 
original and sufficiently creative. 
At this point, we would have fixed the outer boundary of the author’s claim to 
copyright protection. 
Step 3:  Does the work fall within a protected category of § 102(a)? 
As noted above, Congress did not exhaust its constitutional power in extending 
copyrights to certain categories of works in the 1976 Act.62  Thus, in order to 
obtain protection, authors must demonstrate that their works fall within one of the 
enumerated categories of protected works in § 102(a).  A yoga sequence is not a 
literary work, even though it can be described in words and symbols.63  It is a work 
that is about human bodies and their arrangements in space.  Only two statutory 
categories cover bodies and arrangements in space: dramatic works, and 
pantomimes and choreographic works.64  Given the lack of dramatic or narrative 
elements in most yoga sequences, the strongest claim for the creator of a yoga 
sequence is the latter. 
Determining whether a yoga sequence can qualify as a choreographic work is an 
exercise in statutory interpretation.  Unfortunately, the 1976 Act did not define 
choreographic works.65  We know, however, that in extending copyright protection 
to choreographic works, Congress did not intend to protect all forms of bodily 
movement.66  According to the Copyright Office, choreographic works must be 
 
sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how 
crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”) (citations omitted).   
 62. See supra note 52. 
 63. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL 
REPORT 15 (1978) (explaining that a computer program is a literary work because it involves “placing 
symbols in a medium”).  The textual or visual depiction of the yoga sequence may serve as a “copy” of 
the work, but those depictions are not the work that is claimed.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies” as 
“material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device”). 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3)–(4). 
 65. Prior to the 1976 Act, choreographic works were eligible for copyright protection as dramatic 
works if they “told a story, developed or characterized an emotion, or otherwise conveyed a dramatic 
concept or idea.”  Horgan v. MacMillan Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1986).  On the history of 
choreographic copyrights, see Melanie Cook, Moving To a New Beat: Copyright Protection for 
Choreographic Works, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1287 (1977). 
 66. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (THIRD), § 
805.1 (3d ed. 2014).  “The legislative history for the 1976 Copyright Act clearly states that 
‘choreographic works’ do not include social dance steps and simple routines.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 
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“comprised of dance steps, dance movements, and/or dance patterns.”67  Thus, the 
composition of a series of bodily movements which otherwise constitutes 
copyrightable authorship still may not receive protection if it does not amount to 
“dance.”68  According to the Copyright Office, this means that the composition 
should be “intended to be performed by skilled dancers, typically for the enjoyment 
of an audience.”69 
This reference to the “enjoyment of the audience” is interesting.  According to 
the Copyright Office, when determining whether a given work is choreographic 
within the meaning of the Act, we should focus solely on the work’s effects on the 
perceiving audience.  The responses of the performers, it seems, are statutorily 
excluded.  Aspects of the work that are directed at performers should be filtered out 
of our analysis of whether a given set of bodily movements constitutes a dance or 
not.  This is yet another example of copyright law privileging the “higher” senses 
of vision and hearing over the “lower” senses of feeling (or proprioception), taste, 
and smell.70 
Returning to Choudhury’s claim, it seems clear that it would have come to 
naught—but not for the reasons given by the Ninth Circuit.  Choudhury may have 
had some small amount of original and creative authorship in the yoga sequence, 
but his work is not a choreographic work because it is not a dance.71  Although the 
sequence may be more than a series of “functional physical movements,”72 it still 
clearly lacks essential features that would make it a dance, including that it is not 
intended to be performed for an audience.  The transition from “plough pose” to 
“wheel pose,” in this context at least, is not a dance movement. 
Return, however, to the hypothetical creator, Alice, described in the 
Introduction.  Her composition seems to have features that could qualify for 
copyright protection.  The aspects of the composition that were designed to reduce 
blood pressure and minimize injury would be eliminated in Step 1, because they do 
not amount to authorship.  Assuming that the compositional aspects that were 
 
at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52 (1975)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. In a sense, the law in this area resembles previous copyright acts that limited protection to 
works that met certain artistic criteria.  For example, under the 1874 revision to the Act, protection for 
certain pictorial works was limited to those “connected with the fine arts,” and prints and labels were 
explicitly excluded from protection.  Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. 78.  Thus, pictorial works 
that might have met the other criteria for copyright protection were denied it because they fell into 
particular disapproved categories.  Similarly, in the context of choreography, Congress has only 
extended protection to the creation of physical movements that can be characterized as “dance 
movements” even though other sequences of movement might meet the minimal requirements for 
authorship. 
 69. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 66, § 805.5(B)(2). 
 70. See Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. R. 
501 (2012).  For example, the textual components of a culinary recipe are potentially copyrightable if 
they meet the originality and creativity criteria, but the taste of the dish is given no consideration. 
 71. See Carys Craig, Bodies in Motion: Contemplating Choreography and Copyright Law 6 
(2015) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (“The challenge remains how to identify when 
physical movements are merely such, and in what circumstances physical movements are ‘steps’ 
properly understood to be in the nature of an ‘expressive’ work?”). 
 72. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 66, § 805.5(B)(2).  
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intended to create mental effects in performers and in viewers survive the 
originality and creativity inquiries of Step 2, we would then consider whether they 
can qualify as a choreographic work.  Based on the Copyright Office’s analysis, the 
compositional aspects that are directed at performers would not constitute dancing, 
but those that were intended to cause viewers of the composition to think that it is 
graceful and reminiscent of animals in motion could plausibly constitute a dance.  
If so, Alice would have clearly satisfied the first of two statutory hurdles and could 
progress to the final step. 
Step 4:  Apply the appropriate functionality screen. 
In certain cases, a work that otherwise qualifies for copyright protection will not 
receive it because a statutorily imposed functionality screen eliminates it.  As 
explained above, the only screen that acts in this fashion is the threshold based 
screen that is applied to PGS works that constitute useful articles.73  Thus, even 
though a PGS work contains protectable copyrightable authorship, it will receive 
no protection at all if it fails the separability inquiry. 
For choreographic works, however, the threshold screen does not apply.  To the 
extent that choreographic works contain functional elements, those elements are 
simply filtered out.  But by this point in the inquiry, all of that filtering has already 
taken place.  Step 1 filtered out functional elements from the work in construing the 
claim to authorship.  Then, in Step 3, the requirement that only “dance” movements 
count for choreographic works further eliminated some works from protection if 
they did not contain the right kind of body movement authorship.  Thus, if Alice’s 
composition meets the statutory requirements for choreographic works, no 
additional functionality screen is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
All works of authorship also include numerous uncopyrightable features.  
Sometimes those features are unprotectable because they do not represent the right 
kind of creativity (i.e. copyrightable authorship versus patentable inventorship).  In 
other cases, features are not protectable because they are not original or are 
insufficiently creative.  And some features of otherwise protectable works do not 
receive copyright protection because Congress has not chosen to extend it to them.  
These rules govern inquiries about eligibility for copyright protection and about the 
scope of that protection. 
Like many other courts, the Ninth Circuit ran aground trying to apply concepts 
like “ideas,” “process,” and “system” without understanding how they fit within the 
larger copyright scheme.  Moreover, the court reified these concepts, treating them 
as known, stable, and self-defining.  Not all instructions for bringing about results 
are uncopyrightable processes.  Only by understanding the goals and outcomes 
associated with the instructions can we distinguish between the copyrightable 
 
 73. See supra notes 49–51. 
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instructions to engage in a dance from the uncopyrightable instructions about how 
to invest in the stock market.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach skips this analysis and, 
in so doing, risks reaching the wrong conclusion. 
